The internet has not only reduced consumer search costs, but has also enabled more e¢ cient and sophisticated search procedures. For example, online consumers can streamline their search process if appropriately de…ned categories of products and services are available. This paper proposes a search model with product categories where consumers choose which categories to search and …rms respond to such more targeted search by strategically choosing the categories in which to list their products. The analysis focuses on the relationship between category architecture and the type of information which can be credibly disclosed by …rms'category choices to consumers.
Introduction
The classical search paradigm is designed to capture the situation in which consumers visit di¤erent stores before settling on a store or brand which best matches their taste and budget. But, in the internet era, actual consumer search is cheaper, more sophisticated and more e¢ cient. Previous research regarding the e¤ect of the internet on consumer search has focused on the fact that online search reduces search costs. 1 But contemporary consumers can take advantage of online resources that list sellers under various categories to narrow down the list of potential sellers from which to further re…ne their search. Thus the internet has not merely reduced consumers'search costs, but has also changed the way that consumers search. Firms respond to these more sophisticated search procedures and more e¤ectively target the customers they wish to attract, by strategically choosing the sites and product categories under which they are listed. 2 The structure of the di¤erent possible product categories under which …rms may be listed -which we refer to as the category architecture -is typically determined by the search intermediaries themselves. For example Yelp determines the di¤erent categories of restaurants which are available on its site. The actual choice of category under which the …rm is listed may be made either by the search intermediary or by the …rm itself. For example martial art schools may list themselves as either Kung fu, Karate, Jiu-Jitsu etc., or architectural …rms may describe their service as interior design, commercial planning, residential planning or city planning. 3 The paper develops a simple framework to analyze the 'search with categories'set-1 For example, ? provides evidence that the internet reduces search frictions and makes the life insurance market more competitive. Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cunat (2012) ? study how the reduction of search costs induces more …rms to choose niche product designs and so changes the composition of product types in the market. Goldmanis, Hortascu, Syverson and Emre (2010) ? study how the reduction of search costs reallocates market shares from high-cost to low-costs producers.
2 Search with keywords represents an alternative internet search procedure whereby consumers, by looking for certain "keywords", reveal personal information which enables sellers to target consumers more e¤ectively. See, e.g., ? for a model which studies this type of internet search. 3 Clearly there are several possible combinations of the two procedures in which the …rms apply for certain categories and the search intermediaries need to approve or reject the application.
ting in which consumers choose the category in which to search and their stopping rule for each category while …rms choose, beside product characteristics and prices, the categories in which they are listed. The focus of the paper is on the relationship between the category architecture and the type of information which may be credibly disclosed by …rms to searching consumers. In our setting both …rms and consumers actively try to overcome informational asymmetries: …rms by choosing a speci…c category in which to list their product, and consumers by choosing a category in which to search. The …rms'category choice can be viewed as a form of active information disclosure. However, in contrast to conventional information disclosure, in our setting the information which actually reaches consumers depends on the latter's active participation. That is, the information which is disclosed by …rms' choice of category is only revealed to consumers who actually choose to search in that category.
We consider a setting in which each …rm produces one type of product and products are di¤erentiated both horizontally and vertically. There are two types of products, A and B, and each product is available in low or high quality. Consumers di¤er with respect to their preferences between the product types but they all prefer high quality over low quality. Consumers know the distribution of …rms' characteristics but must incur search costs to …nd speci…c product attributes. While in the standard search setup consumers sample the entire population of …rms, here we assume that there are di¤erent categories of products in which consumers may search. The categories may be in terms of …rms' horizontal characteristics only (A or B), vertical characteristics only (high or low qualities), or both types of characteristics. Firms do not control the categorization structure and are unable to create new categories but can only decide in which categories to be listed. The availability of exogenous product categories may enable …rms to direct consumer search and promote more e¢ cient matches between products and consumers.
We begin our analysis by analyzing the …rms'choice of categories with respect to product characteristics under di¤erent category architectures when prices are exogenous. 4 In section 3, we consider the case in which only horizontal categories, A, B and AB, are available, where category AB provides no explicit information about product type. Given this category structure …rms decide the category in which to list their products while consumers choose a category in which to search. In this case, there exists a product-type revealing equilibrium where horizontal characteristics are perfectly revealed (i.e., all A products list in category A and all B products list in category B).
Under certain conditions, there also exists a quality-revealing equilibrium in which the low-quality …rms list according to their horizontal characteristics, while high-quality …rms list in the anonymous AB category. In this equilibrium, a …rm implicitly discloses that it is of high quality by not disclosing its product type. Thus in the former equilibrium consumers have perfect product type information, while in the latter they have perfect quality information.
In section 4, we consider vertical ( In section 5, we endogenize the product quality distribution by opening the market to free entry. This allows us to examine how the category structure feeds back on and determines the equilibrium distribution of product qualities. Focusing on horizontal categorization we show that when search costs are relatively small both the quality revealing equilibrium and the product-type revealing equilibrium exist but the quality revealing equilibrium induces a higher fraction of high-quality …rms and higher consumer surplus.
In section 6, we allow …rms to choose prices as well as categories. We extend the framework presented in Section 2 and demonstrate that our main results regarding categorization and information revelation continue to hold in the model with pricing.
There is a vast literature on consumer search. For example, ?, ?, and ? study 5 We also show that when there are both vertical and horizontal categories (but the latter ones are not veri…able), …rms cannot reveal more information than when there are only horizontal categories are available.
consumer search models with homogenous products where consumers search for low prices. ?, and ? study consumer search models with horizontally di¤erentiated products where consumers search for both low prices and products matching their taste. Our model is more closely related to the latter branch of the literature, but features both horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation. More importantly, in our setting, the introduction of product categories changes the way in which consumers search. In standard search models, …rms are usually ex ante identical and so consumers sample …rms in a random order. But in our setting, some product information can be revealed through …rms'category choices, enabling consumers to search from among more relevant products. In this sense, our paper is also related to ? which studies the optimal stopping rule when options are ex ante asymmetric, and the more recent papers on prominence (caused by online paid placement, for instance) and non-random search (see, for example, Athey and Ellison, 2011 ,? Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou, 2009 ?, Armstrong and Zhou, 2011 ?, and Chen and He, 2011 .
Category choice in our model plays a role similar to advertising product information.
This relates our paper to the literature on search and advertising. For example, ?
and ? study price advertising in a search model where consumers can gather price information through a combination of advertising and their own search. ? considers advertising and search in a monopoly setting but in their model the …rm can advertise either price information or match utility information or both. It is also interesting to note that in a di¤erent setting, ? derive an equilibrium similar to our quality revealing equilibrium. Their model assumes a monopolistic market structure and that products have two vertical attributes. The …rm is able to disclose only one attribute at most but consumers can learn about both attributes through costly search. They show that a signalling equilibrium can exist where the high quality …rm signals that it is of high quality in the second dimension by not disclosing its type in the …rst dimension.
A Model of Search with Categories
Consider a market with a continuum of …rms whose measure is normalized to 1. Firms' products are di¤erentiated both horizontally and vertically. There are two product types, A and B (e.g., A is Japanese food and B is Chinese food). Half of the …rms produce product A and the other half produce product B. In each group of …rms, a fraction produce a high-quality product (denoted H), and a fraction 1 produce a lowquality product (denoted L). A …rm's type is denoted as t f 2 T f = fAH; AL; BH; BLg,
where, for instance, AH indicates product A of high quality. We assume that …rms have constant marginal cost, which is assumed to be zero. In the basic model we keep the number of …rms of each quality type …xed. In section 5 we consider free entry of …rms and endogenize the fraction of …rms of each quality type.
There is a continuum of consumers of measure m. Consumers have heterogenous preferences with respect to the product type (A or B) and with respect to the product quality (H or L). Speci…cally, A and B are located at the two ends 0 and 1 of a
Hotelling line of length one. Consumers are distributed uniformly along this line, and a consumer's location is denoted by x 2 [0; 1]. Let be the Hotelling unit "transportation cost". All consumers prefer high quality to low quality but di¤er in their valuations for quality, which is indexed by q. We assume that q is also uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
Thus, a consumer's type is denoted by t c = (x; q) 2 T c [0; 1] 2 . The valuation of a type (x; q) consumer for the low-quality A product and the high-quality A product are respectively,
Similarly, her valuations for the low-quality B product and the high-quality B product are respectively,
We assume that the basic valuation v is large enough that the market is fully covered.
In our setting products di¤er along two dimensions: product type and quality. The former represents horizontal variation as some consumers prefer product A while others prefer product B. The latter represents vertical variation as all consumers prefer H over L. 6 We assume that ex ante consumers know neither the product type nor the quality of any …rm, but can learn both through a sequential search process. Whenever a consumer investigates a …rm, she learns its type (both its product type and quality). Following convention, we assume that it is costless to investigate the …rst …rm but after that it costs s to investigate each additional …rm. We further assume that search is not too costly such that s < minf 1 2 ; 2 g. After each search, a consumer learns the …rm's type and then decides whether to buy the product or to continue to search. We do not consider prices explicitly in the basic model. Thus, a consumer's surplus from buying product i 2 fA; Bg of quality j 2 fH; Lg after searching n times is U ij (x; q) (n 1)s.
In section 6 we extend the model to include price competition.
In conventional search models, there are no product categories (or, equivalently, there is only one category), and consumers search by sampling …rms randomly as …rms are ex ante identical. Here we depart from this and implicitly suppose that there is an information intermediary (e.g., a search web site) that provides product information in categories. The set of all possible categories is C A fA; B; AB; AH; BH; AL; BL; H; L; HLg :
A category structure C C A speci…es the available categories. For example if there are categories only with respect to the horizontal dimension then C = fA; B; ABg.
When more than one category exists, each …rm needs to choose in which category to list their products 7 and consumers decide in which category to search. Once a consumer chooses a category, she inspect …rms sequentially within this category but may switch categories if she wishes to do so, where …rms within the category are sampled in a random order. Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that a …rm can only list itself under one category. (See section 7 for a discussion of the possibility that a …rm can list under multiple categories.) Note, however, that since we assume a continuum of …rms, a consumer will never search more than one category even if she can -if it was initially optimal to search in a speci…c category, it remains optimal to search that category after 7 We assume that …rms determine the category in which they are listed. Even if the …rm's listing is chosen directly by the intermediary, the …rm can indirectly a¤ect where it is listed by the way that it describes its service or product. Formally, we de…ne "a search problem with categories" as a search problem with a given set of categories C such that (i) the strategy of a …rm is its choice of category S f : T f ! C in which it is listed; (ii) all consumers have the same beliefs about the distribution of product types in each category, denoted as B(C); (iii) given these beliefs consumers choose the category in which to search and their acceptance set in that category, i.e., the set of product types that they are willing to accept in that category without further search. 10 That is, consumers'strategy set is S c :
where AC is consumer's acceptance set (which is a subset of the product types in the chosen category). Let s t f denote the strategy of a …rm of type t f 2 T f , and let s f = fs t f g t f 2T f be a pro…le of all …rms'strategies. Similarly, let s tc denote the strategy of a consumer of type t c 2 T c , and let s c = fs tc g tc2Tc be a pro…le of all consumers' strategies.
Denote by t f (s t f j C; s c ; s f ) the expected pro…t of a …rm of type t f when its category choice strategy is s t f given the category structure C and the strategies of all the other 8 In a model with a …nite number of …rms the search strategy would need to specify a sequence of categories which consumers search through. 9 Or consumers'behavior is such that whenever they observe such a contradiction they do not buy from such …rms. 10 Formally consumers'strategy is a history dependent search rule that speci…es for every history the category of the next search and the acceptance set of the next search. But in order to simplify our discussion we use standard equilibrium condition to simplify the de…nition of consumers'strategy set.
…rms and consumers (s f and s c respectively). Denote by u tc (s tc j C; B(C)) the expected surplus of a consumer of type t c when she chooses strategy s tc given her beliefs about the distribution of product types in each category.
De…nition 1 For a given category structure C a search with categories equilibrium is a triple fs c ; s f ; B (C)g such that:
For each consumer of type t c 2 T c , s tc maximizes the expected surplus u tc (s tc j C; B (C)) given their belief B (C).
For each …rm of type
given consumer search strategies s c and other …rms'strategies s f .
The consumer belief B (C) is consistent with the …rm strategies s f .
Note that the above de…nition applies whether or not …rms can list in more than one category and whether or not categories are veri…able. If …rms are able to list in more than one category, a …rms'strategy is a choice of a subset of C. When categories are veri…able, veri…ability constrains …rms to list only in categories which match their type.
For any category structure C there are sets of strategies s f under which some categories are empty.
De…nition 2 An "empty category"is a category in which the measure of …rms is zero.
The speci…cation of consumer search behavior when there are empty categories is an important ingredient of the consumers'search strategy. When considering a putative equilibrium with one or more empty categories, it is necessary to specify consumers' beliefs and behavior when a …rm deviates and chooses to list under an empty category (which is "supposed" to be empty). We will adopt the following simple behavioral rule: 11 11 An alternative approach would be to follow the signalling literature and specify as part of the equilibrium construction consumers' o¤-equilibrium beliefs if they observe a deviation to an empty category.
Assumption 1 Consumers do not search empty categories.
Under this assumption, a …rm which lists in an empty category has no customers.
Therefore, if in some equilibrium one or more categories are empty, it can never be pro…table for a …rm to deviate by listing itself under such a category. Note that since we assume continuum of …rms a deviation of a …rm to an empty category is not going to change the fact that there is still a measure zero of …rms in this category. 12
Horizontal categories reveal no information
Under horizontal categorization, there is always an uninformative equilibrium where all …rms choose to list under the same category and so categories do not reveal any information at all. This equilibrium is equivalent to the case where there is no categorization at all.
Proposition 1 (Pooling equilibrium) If C = fA; B; ABg, there is always an equilibrium in which all …rms list in category AB and consumers search only in category AB. The characterization of consumer search behavior in category AB is depicted in Figure A1 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is easy to see that …rms have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium category,
given that consumers do not search empty categories. The characterization of consumers search within this category is, however, not trivial 13 and is depicted in Figure A1 in the Appendix.
Horizontal categories reveal product type information
The second type of equilibrium with horizontal categorization is such that …rms'choice of categories actually reveal their product type information.
Proposition 2 (Product-type revealing equilibrium) If C = fA; B; ABg, there is an equilibrium in which all A …rms list in category A and all B …rms list in category 13 Note that even for a consumer with x < 1 2 the ranking of the four possible products depends of his type (x; q):
:
A consumer with a very large q and a very small x will search until she …nd the perfect match AH while on the other hand a consumer with a low q and with an x close to 0:5 will accept the …rst product that she samples without any further search. Similarly a consumer with a high q but x close to 0:5 (a consumer who cares about quality but not too much about product type A or B) will search for a high quality regardless of the type of product while consumers with a low q but with x close to zero or to 1 will search for the "right" product type regardless of its quality.
B, independent of quality, and consumers search either in category A or B and follow the search strategy described in Figure 1 below.
Proof. Given that consumers do not search in empty categories (Assumption 1), …rms have no incentive to deviate and list in category AB. 14 Given …rms' listing strategies, consumers with x < 1 2 search category A while consumers with x 1 2 search category B. In each category, a consumer searches until she …nds a high-quality product if and only if q minf1; s g. To see that, consider, for instance, category A.
If a consumer accepts the …rst sampled product, her expected surplus is v x + q.
(Recall that the …rst search is costless.) If she searches until she …nds a high-quality product (which needs 1 searches on average), her expected surplus is v x+q ( 1 1)s.
The latter is greater if and only if q > s (and notice that q cannot exceed 1 in our model). This optimal search strategy is illustrated in Figure 2 
( 1 1)s Figure 1 : Pattern of demand when horizontal categories reveal product type information 14 If consumers cannot observe the deviation (e.g., category headings do not indicate the number of …rms in that category), it is natural that consumers do not search an empty category (as part of the equilibrium construction). If consumers can observe the deviation, the presumption that listing under an empty category leads to zero pro…t can be justi…ed if consumers hold the (out of equilibrium) belief that a …rm that lists in category AB is low quality. Given that belief, it is a dominant strategy for consumers never to search category AB.
Consumers are better o¤ in this equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium since they can at least get their preferred product type without search. However, to get a high-quality product they, on average, have to search.
Horizontal categories reveal quality information
We now turn to the less obvious (and perhaps also more interesting) equilibrium where horizontal categories provide information about the vertical attribute. In this equilibrium high-quality …rms of either type list in category AB while low-quality …rms of type i list in category i. Then the …rms'category choices fully reveal product quality but only partially reveal their product type. This case is illustrated in Figure 2 (1)
there is an equilibrium in which all high-quality …rms list in category AB, all low-quality i …rms list in category i, i = A; B, and consumers follow the search strategy described in Figure 3 .
Proof. See the Appendix. her expected surplus, when her horizontal location is x, is v x as indicated in the …gure, since she will buy the …rst product she samples and the …rst search is costless.
Similarly, v
(1 x) is the expected surplus of a consumer in the region of "search B" when her location is 1 x. Consumers who care about both quality and product type search category AB (because all products in that category are of high quality) and, within that category, search until they …nd the right product type. They distribute on the two regions of "actively search AB". These consumers search twice on average and their expected search cost is thus s. Their surplus is indicated in each region. Finally, consumers who do not care too much about product type search category AB for highquality products, but accept the …rst product they encounter, whether it is type A or B. They distribute on the central region of "search AB".
The interesting feature of the quality revealing equilibrium is that although the categories provide no explicit information about quality, in equilibrium consumers are able to perfectly infer quality from …rms' category choices: the …rms in category A or B
supply low-quality products while those in category AB supply high-quality products.
In particular, the apparently uninformative category AB now endogenously conveys quality information, and the partially informative categories A and B are now fully informative. However, since category AB is not informative about product type, consumers who are sensitive to product quality have to "pay" for high-quality, either by not buying their preferred product type (the region of "search AB") or by engaging in costly search for the right type (the regions of "actively search AB").
However, the quality revealing equilibrium exists only when condition (1) holds.
For example, when = 1, it simpli…es to (2+s)(1 s+s 2 ) 4 s s 2 +s 3 1 s + s 2 . The set of (s; ) which satisfy this condition is the region between the two solid curves in Figure 4 below. Intuitively, for a given s, the fraction of high-quality …rms cannot be too high or too low. If is too high, then the market for high-quality products is too crowded and each high-quality …rm faces only low demand. Therefore those …rms would switch to category i 2 fA; Bg and compete with relatively few low-quality …rms. By contrast, if is too low, the market for low-quality products is too crowded and low-quality …rm would want to list in category AB and compete with high-quality …rms. 15 One may wonder if it is also possible that low-quality …rms, either of type A or type B, list in category AB while …rms that produce the high-quality i product list in category i, i = A; B: It is not di¢ cult to see that this cannot be an equilibrium. 
Horizontal categories and consumer welfare
We now turn to the e¤ects of horizontal categorization on consumer welfare. The uninformative pooling equilibrium is clearly the worst for consumers. But di¤erent consumers may have di¤erent preferences between the product-type revealing equilibrium and the quality revealing equilibrium. From Figures 1 and 3 we can compare each type of consumer's surplus under the two equilibria. For example, consumers with relatively low valuation of quality but who are choosy about product type (i.e., those located on the southeast and southwest corners), prefer the product-type revealing equilibrium. In both equilibria, they get the right product type but in the product-type revealing equilibrium they also get high quality with probability . While the consumers for whom both quality and product type are important (i.e., those located on the northeast and northwest corners), prefer the quality revealing equilibrium if s (the search cost needed to …nd the right product type in the quality revealing equilibrium) is less than ( 1 1)s (the search cost needed to …nd a high-quality product in the product-type revealing equilibrium), i.e., if the fraction of high-quality …rms < 1 2 . The following result compares total consumer surplus between the two equilibria.
Proposition 4 The quality revealing equilibrium gives rise to higher total consumer surplus than the product-type revealing equilibrium if and only if 2 3 s 2 1 2 + 1 s + 1 + s 2 1 1 1 < 0 :
For example, when = 1, the region between the two dashed curves in Figure   4 below describes the set of (s; ) which satisfy condition (2). Recall that the quality revealing equilibrium exists only when (s; ) is between the two solid curves. Therefore, only in the region in the middle does the quality revealing equilibrium exists and also generates higher consumer surplus. Beyond this region, either the quality revealing equilibrium does not exist or it is dominated by the product-type revealing equilibrium in terms of consumer welfare.
Vertical Categorization
Vertical categories are very common in many websites. Examples of such categories include the …ve-star rating system for hotels, rating of airlines etc. Moreover, many online information intermediaries rate sellers according to customers'quality reviews.
We start by considering the case in which there are only vertical categories: C = fH; L; HLg. As before, there is always a trivial equilibrium in which all …rms list in the same category, say HL, and therefore categorization provides no information. Consumers who care enough about quality will search in AH even though they may end up buying the wrong product type. No …rms want to deviate and list in empty category BH because consumers do not search empty categories. In fact, this equilibrium is e¤ectively identical to the quality-revealing equilibrium when the category structure is C = fA; B; ABg.
Free Entry and Endogenous Product Quality
Thus far we have assumed that the distribution of product quality is exogenously given.
We now extend our model allowing for free entry focusing on the e¤ect of categorization on the percentage of high-quality …rms in the industry. Firm can enter the industry by paying an entry cost, where the entry cost for a high-quality …rm is F H and the entry cost of a low-quality …rm is F L < F H . We focus on the horizontal category structure C = fA; B; ABg since considering (unveri…able) vertical categories cannot lead to more informative new equilibria. We assume that …rms enter the industry as long as their pro…ts cover their entry costs. Since the …rms' pro…ts depend on the categorization equilibrium, the percentage of …rms of each type depends on the category structure and the type of equilibrium which obtains. Our main result is presented in the following proposition. Its proof and the properties of the resultant market structure are derived with the aid of three lemmas that are presented after the proposition.
Proposition 7 In a free-entry market with a su¢ ciently small search cost s, both the product-type revealing equilibrium and the quality revealing equilibrium exist, and the quality revealing equilibrium induces a higher fraction of high-quality …rms and leads to greater consumer surplus.
In order to prove this proposition we …rst investigate the conditions under which the quality revealing equilibrium in Proposition 3 exists in a free-entry setting. It turns out that when search costs are su¢ ciently small this equilibrium always exists in a free-entry environment.
Let n be the total measure of …rms in the free-entry equilibrium, and be the fraction of high-quality …rms as before.
Lemma 1 In a free-entry market, if the condition
holds, there exists a quality revealing equilibrium where the fraction of high-quality …rms
(4)
In particular this equilibrium always exists for su¢ ciently small search costs.
To illustrate condition (3), let us consider the example with = 1. 17 The left-hand side of (3) increases from 0 to 5 12 , and so the quality revealing equilibrium exists if F L F H 5 12 . We then turn to the product-type revealing equilibrium. 17 So s < 1 2 from our assumption that s < minf 1 2 ; 2 g.
Lemma 2
In a free-entry market, if s F L F H , there exists a product-type revealing equilibrium where the fraction of high-quality …rms is
Proof. See the Appendix. 
In the following Lemma we compare the fraction of high-quality …rms and consumer welfare between these two equilibria:
Lemma 3 (i) If the condition
holds, both equilibria exist and the quality-revealing equilibrium induces a higher proportion of high-quality …rms than the product-type revealing equilibrium.
(ii) If the conditions (6) and
hold, both equilibria exist and the quality-revealing equilibrium gives rise to higher consumer surplus than the product-type revealing equilibrium.
To prove Proposition 7 it su¢ ces to note that when the search cost s is close to zero, both conditions (7) and (8) are satis…ed. Therefore there is a higher proportion of high-quality …rms in the quality revealing equilibrium and consumers are also better o¤ under this equilibrium.
Search Categories and Pricing
So far we have only considered di¤erences between product characteristics without formally considering price competition. In this section we extend our analysis to include price competition. Our aim is to show that the equilibria with information disclosure derived in the base model can still exist when prices are endogenous.
There are two ways to incorporate pricing into our setting of search with categories.
One is to assume that there are "pricing categories". The second, more conventional approach is to allow for endogenous prices within each category. We believe that both approaches are realistic and applicable to di¤erent market settings.
The …rst approach is a direct extension of our previous analysis in which the vertical categories represent two di¤erent price levels. Since all consumers prefer low prices over high prices, L now stands for high prices and H now stands for low prices. Note that indeed many search intermediaries use discrete price categories such as $ and $$ symbols for restaurants etc. We thus can view prices as a special case of vertical di¤erentiation such that the H and L categories represent two levels of prices. 18
The second approach, which is the focus of this section, assumes that …rms may choose any price they wish. In this case …rm's strategy, s t f , is a choice of a category and a price. We denote by P (C) the price distribution in each category in the category structure C. 19 We assume that all consumers have the same beliefs about the distribution of product types and prices in each category: fB(C); P (C)g. Consumer's strategy, s tc , is a choice of category in which to search and an acceptance set which is a set of product types and prices that they are willing to accept. We can thus modify our previous de…nition of search with categories equilibrium in the following way.
De…nition 3 For a given category structure C a search with categories equilibrium is a quadruple fs c ; s f ; B (C); P (C)g such that:
For each type of consumers, their search strategy s tc is optimal given their beliefs fB (C); P (C)g. 18 One can extend our setup to include several price levels. 19 Note that P (C) is a vector of distribution of prices.
For each type of …rms, their strategy s t f maximizes their pro…ts given consumer strategy s c and other …rms'strategies s f .
The consumer belief fB (C); P (C)g is consistent with the …rms'strategies s f .
To simplify, we modify our basic setup. We assume that there are only two types of consumers in terms of their horizontal preferences who are located at the two ends of the Hotelling line. Half the consumers prefers product A: if they consume a lowquality A product they get utility v, and if they consume a low-quality B product they get utility v . The other half of consumers prefers product B. We further assume that is su¢ ciently large such that consumers have strong horizontal preferences (e.g., a consumer who prefers product A will never want to buy a B product). We also assume that v > s such that products are su¢ ciently valuable. The additional utility from higher quality remains the same as before, and we focus on the category structure C = fA; B; ABg. As before, for convenience we assume that horizontal categories are veri…able.
Product-type revealing equilibrium
We …rst investigate the consider the product-type revealing equilibrium where all i 2 fA; Bg …rms list in category i 2 fA; Bg, independent of their quality types. We seek to characterize an equilibrium where all the low-quality …rms charge p L = v while all the high-quality …rms charge p H v. Consumers that prefer product i 2 fA; Bg search only category i 2 fA; Bg. For all consumers, the low-quality product at the price p L = v provides a zero surplus. But whether the high-quality product provides a positive surplus or not depends on a consumer's type q.
Given the consumers'(correct) beliefs about the distribution of prices and qualities in each category their optimal search behavior is as follows:
(i) For a consumer with q < p H v, the high-quality product provides a negative surplus and so she searches only once (given the …rst search is free). If the product she samples …rst is of low-quality she buys it immediately. If the …rst sampled product is of high quality, she leaves the market without purchasing anything.
(ii) For a consumer with p H v q p H v + s , the high-quality product provides a positive surplus, but the surplus is too small to be worth searching for. So this type of consumer searches only once and buys whatever good she samples at the …rst search.
(iii) For a consumer with q > p H v + s , the high-quality product is su¢ ciently attractive that she searches until she …nds it. 20
Regarding the …rms'category choices, it is clear that …rms cannot bene…t by deviating and listing themselves in AB since consumers do not search empty categories. 21
So it remains to ensure that …rms have no incentive to change their prices given the above consumer search behavior. The following proposition provides the conditions.
Proposition 8 Suppose C = fA; B; ABg, and the condition
holds. Then there exists a product-type revealing equilibrium where low-quality …rms charge a price p L = v and high-quality …rms charge a price p H = 1
Quality revealing equilibrium
We now consider the quality revealing equilibrium where all the low-quality …rms list in category A or B according to their type while all the high-quality …rms list in category AB. We focus on an equilibrium in which all the low-quality …rms charge the price p L and all the high-quality …rms charge p H . Since all low-quality …rms are identical, the Diamond paradox result implies that in equilibrium p L = v. In this equilibrium, consumers'optimal search rule is characterized by two cuto¤s, q 1 and q 2 > q 1 : 20 Note that in order for a search equilibrium with all three types of consumers to exist, we need that p H v + s < 1. 21 Given that categories are veri…able, an A …rm, say, cannot list itself in B category. But even if categories are unveri…able, …rms have no incentive to deviate because consumers choose to search categories according to their own preferences and buy only the type of product that they like (under our assumption that is su¢ ciently large).
(i) A consumer with q < q 1 searches in category A or B (depending on what type of product she likes) and buys the low-quality product at any price no greater than v.
(ii) A consumer with q 12 searches in category AB and buys if and only if the product she …nds at her …rst search is the type of product she prefers. Otherwise she leaves the market without buying.
(iii) A consumer with q > q 2 searches in category AB until she …nds the right product.
Given p L = v, the surplus from searching in the low-quality product category is zero. Then we must have
such that a consumer of type q 1 is indi¤erent between searching in the low-quality product category and searching in the high-quality one. A consumer who chooses to search in category AB will not stop searching until she …nds the right product if 1 2 (v + q p H ) > s or equivalently q > 2s + p H v. Hence, we have
To sustain the proposed equilibrium, we need to …nd q 1 or p H such that …rms have no incentive to change their category choices or prices. The following proposition claims that this requirement is satis…ed if p H satis…es the following three conditions: 22 Proposition 9 Suppose C = fA; B; ABg, and there is a price p H that satis…es conditions (12)- (14) . Then there exists a quality revealing equilibrium in which the lowquality …rms of type i choose category i 2 fA; Bg and charge a price p L = v, and all high-quality …rms choose category AB and charge a price p H .
In order for it to be optimal for high-quality …rms to list in AB, the number of consumers which search there must be su¢ ciently large, which requires that p H not be too large. It must also be optimal for high-quality …rms in AB to charge p H rather than deviate to some other price. The conditions in Proposition 9 guarantee that the high-quality …rms as well as the low-quality …rms cannot bene…t from a unilateral deviation from p H and p L and from their choice of categories. Notice that Proposition 9 identi…es a range of p H that can be part of equilibrium behavior, so the quality revealing equilibrium is not unique.
Discussion: vertical categories. We saw in section 3 that when all products are priced the same, the quality revealing equilibrium can exist only under the horizontal category architecture but not under the vertical category architecture (if vertical categories are not veri…able). This result is modi…ed when we introduce endogenous pricing.
Speci…cally, suppose the available categories are H and L and prices are endogenous.
Then for appropriate parameter values we can construct an analogous equilibrium to the one presented in Proposition 9 in which low-quality …rms of both types list in L and charge the price v, 23 and high-quality …rms of both types list in H and charge some buy only if they …nd the right type of product at their …rst search and consumers with su¢ ciently high values of q search for their preferred product type. The details of the construction are similar to the above and are omitted. 23 We assume that consumers have su¢ ciently strong type preferences that it is not pro…table for low quality …rms to reduce the price in order to sell to both types of consumers.
Discussion and Concluding Comments
We have considered a very speci…c setup of search with categories. Clearly there are di¤erent aspects of search markets with categories that are important and deserve a more careful analysis. In our concluding section we discuss some of these issues and their potential e¤ect on market analysis.
Multiple listings. In our basic setup each …rm chooses one category. When the model is interpreted in terms of advertising or positioning by …rms, it is natural to assume that a …rm can list under one category only. But when categorization is implemented by an intermediary such as a search engine, it may be necessary to extend the model to allow for the possibility that …rms may list under multiple categories. One possibility is that …rms choose a subset of the provided categories in which to list where the cost of listing is determined by speci…c market arrangements. Formally, our model can handle such situations by modifying the …rms'strategy choice from a single category to a subset of categories. Another possibility is that multiple listings are automatically implemented by the search engine, so that when a …rm chooses to list in a narrow category, it is automatically also listed in a more general category. For example, if a …rm lists under category A its also automatically appears in category AB. We provide a brief analysis of the latter case in the following paragraph in order to demonstrate the possible e¤ects of multiple listing.
Consider the horizontal category structure C = fA; B; ABg and suppose that if a type-i …rm chooses to list in category i 2 fA; Bg, it will automatically appear also in the more general category AB. Consider a possible product-type revealing equilibrium …rst. Suppose all A …rms choose to list in category A and all B …rms choose to list in category B. Then all …rms will also appear in category AB. Given that consumers will only search in either category A or category B; no …rms want to list in category AB only. Therefore, a similar product-type revealing equilibrium always exists even if we allow multiple listings. 24
Now consider a possible quality revealing equilibrium. Suppose AL type …rms choose 24 It is also easy to see that it is still an equilibrium that all …rms list in category AB given that consumers do not search empty categories.
to list in category A and BL …rms choose to list in category B, and all high-quality …rms choose to list in category AB. Then the automatic multi-listing implies that all …rms will actually appear in category AB. Compared to the case with single listing, quality information is not totally revealed and the expected quality of category AB becomes lower. But this cannot be sustained as an equilibrium because a high-quality …rm can always do better by listing in category i. In fact, given the automatic enrollment into category AB, listing in category A or B weakly dominates listing in category AB.
This result implies that whenever intermediaries wish to design the rules of category a¢ liation they need to take into account the fact that multi-listing may destroy the possibility of using categories to signal the …rms'quality.
Endogenous consumer participation. Our analysis has assumed full-market coverage,
i.e., all consumers buy the product. But search with categories may have interesting implications regarding the number of consumers participating in the market. When there is no categorization (or if the uninformative pooling equilibrium prevails), some consumers may opt out of the market because they anticipate an ine¢ cient search process. For example, assume that most of the …rms are type A and there are very few type B …rms and consider a consumer with a very strong preference for type B product. Searching for type B may be very costly and therefore the consumer is better o¤ not entering the market. Horizontal categorization may solve the problem by making it easier for the consumer to …nd the product he likes and therefore induce him to participate in the market.
Platform design. Generally the category structure is chosen by the information platform. So in addition to the fee structure that is often discussed in the literature, how to design the category structure is an important decision for the platform. It will a¤ect both consumers'willingness to use the information service and …rms'listing strategies and their willingness to list in the platform.
Prominence and Categorization. The standard search setup assumes that all the objects (the …rms in our case) are randomly sampled, each with the same probability. The search and prominence literature assumes that objects may be sampled with di¤erent probabilities, such that a more prominent object is sampled with a higher probability.
The objects'prominence can be either exogenously given or endogenously determined by the …rms'activities. An interesting extension would be to introduce prominence into our model of search with categories. Speci…cally, …rms may have di¤erent prominence in di¤erent categories (when prominence is determined exogenously). Thus the …rms' category choice may depend also on its prominence in the di¤erent categories and not just on the categories'signalling value. When prominence is endogenously determined, say by advertising, it may be that the cost of achieving prominence is di¤erent for different categories which again may a¤ect the …rms'category choice. Such an extension is beyond the focus of this paper and may hold promise for interesting future research.
Appendix
Consumer search behavior in the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 1. Consider a consumer at x < 1 2 . (The case for x > 1 2 is symmetric.) She values and ranks the four possible products as follows:
In particular, if this consumer has a relatively high valuation for quality, she prefers BH to AL though the former is not her ideal product type. By contrast, if she has a relatively low valuation for quality, she prefers AL to BH.
Suppose q
( 1 2x). If the consumer buys the …rst product she samples, her expected surplus is v 2 + q. If she buys products no worse than AL, she needs to search 2 1+ times on average and so her expected surplus will be 1 1 + (v x) + 2 1 + v + q 2 2 1 + 1 s :
If she buys high-quality products only (i.e., product BH or AH), she needs to search 1 times and so her expected surplus will be v + q 2 1 1 s :
Finally, if she buys the ideal product AH only, she needs to search 2 times and her expected surplus will be v + q x 2 1 s :
Comparing these four options reveals the optimal search strategy when q (1 2x).
The case of q < (1 2x) can be dealt with similarly. The optimal consumer search behavior is described in Figure A1 below. There, for example, "AH" indicates that consumers on that region stop searching only if they …nd a product no worse than AH, and "BH/AL"indicates that the threshold product for consumers on that region is the worse one between BH and AL (depending on q (1 2x) or not). Step 1: consumer search behavior in equilibrium. Suppose that indeed in equilibrium high-quality …rms list in AB, low-quality i …rms list in category i and consumers believe that …rms list in this manner. Consider a consumer at x < 1 2 (the case with x > 1 2 is symmetric). She has three relevant search options. The …rst is to search category A and get a low-quality A product; the second is to search category AB and buy the …rst product she encounters; and the third option is to search category AB until she …nds an AH product. The optimal search behavior can be derived by comparing these three options. (Notice that searching category B is dominated by searching category A for a consumer at x < 1 2 .) If a consumer searches category A then, given her belief about the distribution of qualities she will buy the …rst product she samples. Thus her expected surplus will be v
x. Suppose the consumer searches category AB. If she does not actively search in AB and buys the …rst product she samples, her expected surplus will be
If she searches sequentially until …nding an A product then she needs to sample two products on average. Since the …rst sampling is costless, the (expected) search cost is only s. Consequently her expected surplus will be v + q x s :
By comparing these three options, one can readily check that given our assumption s < minf 1 2 ; 2 g the optimal consumer search behavior is described as in Figure 3 .
Step 2: A high-quality …rm has no incentive to deviate and list in category A or B.
Without loss of generality, consider an AH …rm. Given consumer search behavior, in the proposed equilibrium, an AH …rm's demand is
where (1 s + s 2 )m is the measure of consumers who chooses category AB, and is the measure of high-quality …rms. Notice that due to symmetry, an AH …rm has the same demand as a BH …rm, and thus each high-quality …rm's demand is simply the number of consumers that search in the AB category divided by the number of …rms listing in this category.
Suppose then an AH …rm deviates and chooses to list in category A. Then the consumers who search this category and encounter it will buy its product without further search. So this AH …rm's demand will be identical to any AL …rm's demand in category A. To calculate this demand notice that in the proposed equilibrium, s 2 (1 s )m consumers choose to search in category A, and there are 1 2 AL …rms in this category. Therefore,
Consequently, a high-quality …rm has no incentive to deviate and list in category A or
Step 3: A low-quality …rm has no incentive to deviate and list in category AB.
Consider an AL …rm. Its equilibrium demand is Q L in (16). Suppose now that this …rm deviates and lists in category AB. To calculate the deviation demand we need to …gure out how a consumer who chooses to search category AB will behave if she encounters this deviation …rm. We only need to consider those consumers on the left region of "actively search AB" and the region of "search AB" in Figure 3 . (Those consumers on the right region of "actively search AB"will never buy from this AL …rm since they do not even buy from an AH …rm.)
If a consumer buys from this AL …rm, her surplus is v x. If she searches once more and buys at the next …rm (which must supply a high-quality product), her expected surplus is v + q 2 s. If she searches until …nding an AH product, her expected surplus is v + q x 2s. (Notice that the consumer needs to search twice on average in order to …nd an AH product.) The consumer's optimal behavior can be derived by comparing these three options. Given the assumption of s < 1 2 , the consumer will buy from this deviation …rm if she locates on [0; 1 2 s ] [s; 2s] or on the region of "search AB"below the line q = ( 1 2 x) + s. One can verify that the area of this whole region is s 2 + s 2 4 . Notice that for an AH product, those consumers on the left region of "actively search AB"or on the region of "search AB"will buy it immediately once they sample it. The area of the whole region is 1 s 2 + s . But the purchasing area for an AL product in the deviation case is a subset of it. Thus, the deviation …rm's demand is a proportion of the equilibrium demand for an AH …rm: (1 s) + 2s Q H Q L :
Combining (17) and (18) which is equal to (1) by using (15) and (16).
Proof of Proposition 4. From Figure 1 , one can derive total consumer surplus in the product-type revealing equilibrium:
v + 1 2 4 1 1 s s 2 2 :
From Figure 3 , one can derive total consumer surplus in the quality revealing equilib-
The latter is larger than the former if (2) holds.
Proof of Lemma 1. If a quality revealing equilibrium exists, from (15) and (16) we know that the pro…t of a high-quality …rm and the pro…t of a low-quality …rm (without considering the entry cost) are respectively H (n; ) = 1 s + s 2 m n ; L (n; ) = s s 2 m n(1 ) :
Then the free-entry conditions are 1 s + s 2 m n = F H ; s s 2 m n(1 ) = F L :
They determine n and . In particular, one can solve
Recall that the condition for the quality revealing equilibrium is (1):
The second half of this condition holds given F L < F H . One can check that the …rst half of the condition also holds if and only if (3) is satis…ed.
Proof of Lemma 2. If the product-type revealing equilibrium exists, a high-quality …rm's pro…t is H (n; ) = 1 minf1; s g m n + minf1; s g m n :
For those consumers with q > s , a high-quality …rm is competing only with other high-quality …rms. But for those with q < s , it is competing with all …rms. (Note that we need to take into account the possibility that s > 1.) For a low-quality …rm, only those consumers with q < s may patronize it and it is competing with all other …rms.
Hence, a low-quality …rm's pro…t is L (n; ) = minf1; s g m n :
The free-entry conditions are then:
(We allow weak inequalities because corner solutions may exist in this case.) Then one can show that the equilibrium described in the lemma exist when s < F L F H . 25
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) It is ready to derive (7) by comparing (4) and (5). One can also check that under the assumption of s < minf 1 2 ; 2 g, (7) implies (6) and so both equilibria exist.
(ii) From the proof of Proposition 4, we can see that consumer welfare in the quality revealing equilibrium does not depend on . Therefore, the condition for the quality revealing equilibrium to generate higher consumer welfare is the same as before:
except that is now given in (5). Substituting (5) into this inequality yields (8).
Proof of Proposition 8. In the proposed equilibrium, the low-quality …rms charge the price p L = v. Clearly these …rms cannot raise their price. On the other hand 25 There are also two product-type revealing equilibria with corner solutions: (i) There always exists a free-entry equilibrium with = 0 (i.e., only low-quality …rms enter the market) in which each …rm earns m n = F L . (ii) When s < F L F H , there exists a free-entry equilibrium with = 1 (i.e., only high-quality …rms enter the market) in which each …rm earns m n = F H . lowering their price may increase the number of units that they sell. Speci…cally, given the consumers'search strategy, a low-quality …rm sells only to consumers who sample it at their …rst search and who do not search for a high-quality product. (No consumers will search for a low-quality product beyond the …rst visited …rm given the (expected) price p L = v.) Therefore, in equilibrium the demand for each low-quality product is m p H v + s . 26 Suppose a low-quality …rm slightly reduces its price to v ". The (…rst-order) loss of doing so is m p H v + s " (i.e., those who buy from this …rm pay " less). The bene…t is that consumers with q slightly higher that p H v + s that continue to search if they sample a low-quality product at the price v will purchase the low-quality good if its price is v ". More precisely, a consumer will buy the lowquality product at price v " instead of continuing to search for a high-quality product if " (v + q p H ) s, i.e., if her type is q p H v + s+" . Therefore, the (…rst-order) bene…t of reducing the price by " is m " v. A low-quality …rm has no incentive to deviate from p L = v if the loss exceeds the bene…t, i.e., if
Now let us consider high-quality …rms. In equilibrium, a high-quality …rm sells to consumers with an intermediate q who buy whatever product they sample at their …rst search and to high-q consumers who search for a high-quality product. Thus the demand they face is m s + 1 (1 (p H v + s )) .
Suppose a high-quality …rm unilaterally reduces its price by a small ". Its (…rstorder) loss is the lower price (by ") paid by existing customers. The bene…t is that it acquires additional new customers with relatively low q -more precisely, those consumers with q > p H v " who sample this …rm …rst -yielding the (…rst-order) bene…t m"p H . In an equilibrium with an interior solution of p H , the loss should be equal to the bene…t, which determines p H as
To sustain the proposed equilibrium, we need to verify the conditions p H v + s 1, 26 Note that the measure of consumers is m and the measure of …rms is 1. So each …rm has m …rst-time visitors. Given the assumption s < v, one can check that the equilibrium price in (20) satis…es these constraints if (9) holds.
Proof of Proposition 9. Given the consumer search behavior described in the main text, we need to ensure that …rms have no incentive to change their category choices or prices. We …rst consider prices and then category choices.
The low-quality …rms charge the monopoly price p L = v and cannot bene…t from changing it according to the standard Diamond paradox argument. Regarding the highquality …rms, it is unpro…table for them to reduce p H below v + q 1 . But what about if a …rm unilaterally raises its price to p H + "? In equilibrium the demand for each high-quality …rm is 1 h m 2 (q 2 q 1 ) + m(1 q 2 )
i :
This is because half of the consumers with q 2 [q 1 ; q 2 ] eventually buy from a high-quality …rm, and all consumers with q > q 2 buy from a high-quality …rm. And the measure of all high-quality …rm is . So the (…rst-order) bene…t of raising the price slightly is " times this equilibrium demand. The (…rst-order) loss caused by this small price increase is derived from those consumers who sample this …rm …rst, have q 2 [q 1 ; q 1 + "] and who like this …rm's product type but will refrain from buying due to the higher price. So the lost demand is m" 2 , which leads to a loss of m" 2 p H . Thus, in equilibrium p H should satisfy m" 2 p H " h m 2 (q 2 q 1 ) + m(1 q 2 ) i :
By using q 1 = p H v and q 2 = q 1 + 2s in (10) and (11), this condition simpli…es to p H 2 3
(1 + v s) :
To ensure that q 1 0 and q 2 1, we need p H v and p H 1 + v 2s. Therefore, to sustain the pricing equilibrium, we need maxfv; 2 3
(1 + v s)g p H 1 + v 2s :
Now consider the …rms'category choice. In the proposed equilibrium, a low-quality …rm's pro…t is
A high-quality …rm's pro…t is
Suppose that a high-quality A …rm deviates and lists in category A. Given all AL …rms are charging p L = v, it can act as a monopoly. If it charges a price p 2 [v; v + q 1 ], then its deviation pro…t is mp 1 [q 1 (p v)]. So the optimal deviation price iŝ p L = maxfv; v + q 1 2 g :
In particular, if p H 2v then the optimal deviation isp L = v. In this case a high-quality …rm will not deviate if
Suppose now that a low-quality A …rm deviates and lists in category AB and charges a price p v. If a consumer with1 encounters this …rm, what will she do? Given the assumption of a su¢ ciently high , only those consumers who like product A may buy. For those consumers with q 2 [q 1 ; q 2 ], they will buy this low-quality product with p v if they like product A. This yields demand m(q 2 q 1 ) 2 = ms . For those consumers with2 , they will buy this low-quality product if v + q p H 2s v p ,2 + v p :
The number of consumers with2 who come to visit this AL …rm is m(1 q 2 ) (1 + 1 2 + ( 1 2 ) 2 + ) = 2m(1 q 2 ) . So the demand from this source is 2m(1 q 2 ) v p 1 q 2 = 2m(v p) :
So this AL …rm's deviation pro…t, when p v, is p ms + 2m(v p) :
So the optimal deviation price is minfv; v 2 + s 4 g. Given our assumption that v s the optimal price is v 2 + s 4 , and the optimal deviation pro…t is m 2 (v + s 2 ) 2 . Therefore, a low-quality …rm will not deviate if or more explicitly if
Therefore, the proposed quality revealing equilibrium exists if p H 2v, and both conditions (21) and (22) hold.
